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INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the water industry of England and Wales passed
from public to private ownership.  During the 1970s and
1980s the publicly owned water authorities suffered from
under investment to the extent that aging pipes leaked and
polluting discharges into the rivers and sea, and out-of-
date and overloaded waste water treatment works were
commonplace.  Capital investment was dependent upon
central government funding and the industry was always a
prime target for government cutbacks; there being no votes
in new sewers, compared to for example, new schools. The
Conservative Government (1979-97) was a great believer
in private ownership and during its eighteen year reign
many state assets passed to the private sector as prime
minister Thatcher sought to roll back the frontiers of the
state by creating a share owning democracy.
Apart from some concerted efforts on leakage control in
the 1980s the water industry has traditionally favoured a
supply led approach to water resources management. It is
only in the last few years that demand management has
gained credence as a potential solution to keeping supply
and demand in balance, primarily due to regulatory
pressure, the growing awareness of environmental issues
and the droughts of 1989-92 and 1995-96.
This paper sets out some of the consequences of
privatising the water industry in England and Wales and
discusses whether privatisation has been an advantage or
disadvantage, in relation to the management of water
demand.
BACKGROUND
A Local Government and water industry re-organisation in
1974 replaced  the 100 water boards, 50 local council
undertakings, 27 river authorities, 2 river conservancies,
1366 council sewerage undertakings and 7 joint sewerage
undertakers with 10 regional water authorities in England
and Wales.  The thirty small and historically private water
companies (supply only) were unaffected.  The new water
authorities were based on river catchment areas and they
had control over the water cycle from source to sea,
including water supply, sewerage, flood prevention, river
quality and sludge disposal.  Such a structure allowed the
water authorities to plan at a strategic level and better
utilise water resources.  The new European Water
Directive (consultation draft issued in 1996) will instruct
all European countries to p lan and  manage their
catchments on this basis, so in many ways England and
Wales (such a re-organisation did not take place in
Scotland) were ahead of the times.  What could not have
been foreseen however, was that such a re-organisation, by
greatly reducing the number of water and sewerage
undertakings, would ease the path to privatisation some
fifteen years later.
In 1989 the water authorities were privatised and renamed
water companies.  The total assets of the authorities
(including reservoirs, pumping stations, treatment works,
offices etc.) in addition to the management of those assets
all passed into private ownership making this privatisation
unique in comparison with other countries.  The
Government ensured that share sales were a huge success
with the British public because they were guaranteed a
quick return on their investment.  It has been estimated
that the net proceeds of the sale were £3.6 billion for
assets estimated to be worth £34.5 billion (with the
taxpayer picking up the cheque for the difference)
[HMSO, 1992-93].  However, because water and sewerage
services are essentially a monopoly there had to be
regulation to protect the interests of consumers and the
environment.
THE REGULATORS
The water industry of England  and W ales is arguably one
of the most heavily regulated industries in the world.
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The Secretary of State for the Department of the
Environment, Transport and the Regions is responsible for
the regulatory framework for the water industry of
England and W ales.  There are two main regulators:
The Office of W ater Services (Ofwat) - whose role is to
ensure that the functions of a water company are properly
financed and  carried  out.
The Environment Agency (‘the Agency’) - is responsible
for the provision of water resources and the protection and
enhancement of the natural environment.
THE  REGULATORY AG ENDA AND  WATER
RESOURCES
There has been a water abstraction licensing system in
England and Wales since 1965.  One of the problems with
the catchment based water authorities was that they were
in the posit ion of adjudicating on their own licence
applications, i.e. they were both poacher and gamekeeper.
This manifested itself in other ways; they had powers to
prosecute polluters, but rarely did so because the worst
polluters were themselves.
The Environment Agency, with a duty to conserve,
redistribute or otherwise augment water resources and to
secure the proper use of those resources is now the
independent abstraction licensing authority (HMSO,
1991).  This gives the Agency the power to refuse
applications for new resources if it considers that there has
been insufficient progress in managing demand.  The
Agency is also in the process of agreeing to a water
resources plan with each water company.  Prior to 1989,
opposition to new water resource schemes was left
principally to well organised environmental pressure
groups.  The Agency, in seeking to strike a balance
between the needs of the environment and the abstractor,
currently believes that far more could and should  be done
to manage existing demands.
The Office of Water Services agrees to the price limits of
water companies and protects consumer interests.  To
achieve this they are looking to the water companies to be
more economical and efficient in carrying out their
functions.  Ofwat wants to see the least-cost option
adopted by the water companies in maintaining the
balance between supply and demand, with an expectation
that the demand management options will receive a
thorough consideration.  In particular Ofwat has been a
strong advocate of metering households (the proportion of
metered households has risen from 2 .6 percent in 1992  to
9.2 percent in 1998).
THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  PRIVATISATION 
FOR  DEMAND  MANAGEM ENT
The Number’s Game and Restructuring
From 1991 to 1997 on average, the water companies have
reduced their staffing levels from 46,436 to 37,379 a
reduction of around 20 percent.  In some companies this
reduction has been more severe, where up to 40 percent
reductions have occurred (Water Service Assoc., 1991).
The main driver for this has been the need to improve the
company’s performance indicators, many of which have
number of employees as their denominator.  The water
companies would argue that this does not imply any loss
of service since the former jobs of these employees are
‘outsourced’.  In many cases this has been accompanied by
a loss of expertise and focus as the following example
illustrates.
There is no history of water conservation in the UK,
primarily because our appliances have always been to
some extent ‘efficient’ (by US standards) .  Mains leakage,
due to aging systems dating from the industrial revolution,
however was recognised as a problem.  In the 1980s with
system leakage at around 30 percent or higher many water
authorities started to address the problem by better
monitoring and employing inspectors to find leaks.  As
privatisation approached staff employed on leakage
control were easy targets for the next round of job cuts, as
the consequences of such actions would not be felt
imme diately;  a case of classic short-termism.
Unsurprisingly, continual reductions in staffing levels and
uncertainty over the future have severely affected morale
in the water companies.
Much of this has been allied to restructuring in the water
companies to yield ‘business efficiencies’.  Often this has
resulted in staff being even more remote from the
communities they serve.  This is particularly important in
relation to water conservation activity, where a good
relationship with the community is considered a pre-
requisite for success.
The Financial Profit Motive
A private company’s first duty is to provide its
shareholders with a financial return.  Although companies
may talk about their ‘stakeholders’ (shareholders,
customers, community and environment) the reality is that
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the shareholders are the main concern.  Ideally the
financial profit motive would be aligned with the best
interests of the four stakeholders.  Evidence to the fact that
this alignment has not taken place is the detailed and
frequent regulatory intervention into water company
activities.  This is not entirely the fault of water
companies.  The current regulatory regime, allows
companies to increase their charges by RPI +/- K where
RPI is the Retail Price Index and K is a capital allowance
determined by investment need.  In the case of water
resource investment, assuming the water company can
convince Ofwat of the need for a new water resource
development, this is “allowed for” in K and the company
is guaranteed a rate of return on that investment.  The
alternative to water resource development, demand
management and water conservation, does not receive the
same consideration.  The situation at present is that the
cost of meter installations may be ‘awarded’ in K (to be
determined later this year) but it is expected that any other
water conservation activity will have to be financed from
the company’s revenue.   There is no financial incentive
for the water companies to actively manage their demand.
So it seems reasonable to conclude that what is arguably
in the best interests of three of the stakeholders
(community, customers, and environment) is in direct
conflict with the interests of the most important
stakeholder, the shareholders.
This dilemma is recognised by Mark Clifton writing in the
water industry’s weekly magazine, Water (Clifton, 1997):
Since companies have a duty to promote water efficiency
to all their custom ers, it would be inappropriate to subject
them to a price control that gave them incentives to
expand  demand.  In other regulated industries, however,
price control formulae have been deliberately modified  to
give companies a positive incentive to reduce demand.
For example, in electricity and gas, some price controls
have been changed from controls on the average revenue
per unit of energy supplied to controls on total revenue.
Once revenue is fixed, such companies can increase
profits by reducing demand (and hence costs).  Given
stronger incentives through the price con trol formula to
reduce demand, water companies may be more willing to
press ahead with seasonal tariffs and other innovative
ideas sought by Ofwat.
Customer Relations and Public Perception
The public water authorities were not loved, but neither
were they particularly disliked.  They were seen as
beauracratic and inefficient, and a place where a job was
‘for life’.  Despite the success of the share sale the British
people have d ifficulty accepting the concept of profit
being made out of collecting and distributing water.  Since
privatisation, year-on-year water company profits have
soared, as have executive salaries.  The greater dividends
paid to shareholders seem to be at the expense of
operational maintenance, particularly leakage control in
the early years.  The public resents this primarily because
they see the water industry as a monopoly not subject to
normal business risk.  The consequence of this has been a
deteriorating relationship (although this is variable across
the companies) between company and customer.
Nowhere was this better illustrated than in the drought of
1995.  Yorkshire Water, from being initially complacent,
found their water resources being rapidly depleted in the
western part of their service area.  Requests by the
company to conserve water were ignored by an angry
public who believed the situation was caused not by the
weather but by management ineptitude.  Suggestions that
the public might have to face rota-cuts were met with
outrage and employees were advised no t to go in public
places wearing uniform for fear of being attacked.
Eventually Yorkshire Water ruled out rota-cuts as an
acceptable option, and maintained the supply by using 700
road tankers to transfer water to an empty reservoir
(Independent Commission of Inquiry, 1996).
There is a feeling that generally the public are less
prepared to respond to reduce water use and are not so
accepting of restrictions (e.g. hosepipe bans) in droughts.
In part this is due to the  fact that bills have risen (to pay
for the under investment of the past) faster than inflation
and the public’s expectations of the service they receive
have risen.  They are no longer prepared to  accept the
inefficiency expected of a public service.
Some of the water companies view this change in
perception as the call to build in large margins of supply
over demand.  They believe that all forms of restriction
should be avoided, because this is what the customer
expects.  In 1997, the Managing Director of Severn Trent
Water stated (Duckworth, 1997):
I’m not here today to advocate hosepipe bans.  Indeed, I
have been  saying for over two years that such a  term
should be banned from our dictionaries and no company
should ever, in the future, have to resort to such a
measure.  We are all in the customer service business and
none of our customers want bans…We are in the water
supply business - not in  the water restric tion business….
21
We know what our custom ers want and I believe we are in
the business to give them what they need, whenever they
need it.
As a result, the water companies have been extremely
uncomfortable with the idea of working with their
customers in finding a solution to the supply-demand
problem that does not involve the provision of additional
resources. The following two comments are representative
of many of the water companies views on the idea of
entering the customer’s home to carry out water
conservation audits and retrofits:
The adoption of a retrofitting policy would be promoting
a policy of en forcement and confrontation with our
customers [National River Authority (1997)] (Thames
Water).
We are keen to encourage the voluntary adoption by
customers of more efficient washing machines, low flush
WC’s and other water saving devices.  But a more pro-
active approach, as is adopted in parts of America, is
probably too intrusive for our customers  [Derwent, 1996]
(Southern Water).
However, in recent years more progressive companies
have been conducting pilot studies of water conservation
programs to assess costs and water savings of different
approaches.  Almost without excep tion the response to
these studies has been positive, with willingness to
participate as high from unmetered as metered customers,
so financial savings are clearly not the only incentive.
This is beginning to be recognised by the water companies
themselves:
Custom ers are asking us to help them save water, and this
is a challenge for us, the water industry is not used to
dealing with people’s behavioural changes [Smith, 1998]
(Anglian Water).
Water conservation programs are an opportunity for the
water companies to build bridges with their customers and
enhance their public relations image and environmental
credentials in the process.  Far from it being a policy of
confrontation, it is the author’s contention that water
conservation programs provide an open door to better
customer re lations.
It is interesting to speculate on how water conservation
programs would have fared under the previous public
ownership regime.  It is probable that the authorities would
have been more willing to approach their customers, due
to the lack of resentment, but it is easy to imagine them
developing a paternalistic approach.  Such an approach
would not be acceptable under the current privatised
regime:  companies and their customers need and are
seeking a more balanced relationship.
Regulatory P ressures - All Sticks and N o Carrots
The consensus view held  by water conservation
professionals seems to be that a combination of carrots and
sticks will work best (with customers) in attempting to
achieve a conservation goal.  This philosophy of approach
is not apparent in the regulatory regime where it might be
surmised that the same combination would be the most
successful in directing water companies towards water
conservation options.  It has already been mentioned that
the regulatory regime offers very little in the way of
financial incentives for water companies to pursue the
demand management options.  There may be an absence
of carrots, but there has been no shortage of sticks:
• In 1991 and 1993  Ofwat set out that their vision of
charging was one where customers would pay the full
economic cost of the water they use. Although Ofwat
could not enforce this it was clear that they would look
unfavourably on companies with little or no interest in
metering [Office of W ater Services (1991, 1993)]; 
• In 1992 the National Rivers Authority (a predecessor
body to the Environment Agency) declared that
abstraction licenses would not be granted for new
sources unless adequate consideration had been given
to leakage control and metering (National Rivers
Authority, 1992);
•  In 1994 the National Rivers Authority set out a vision
of demand management being a key component of its
National Water Resources Strategy (National Rivers
Authority, 1994);
•  In 1995 the companies were given a duty to promote
water efficiency on behalf of their customers – this has
manifested itself in a water efficiency plan that had to
be submitted to Ofwat.  Progress against the plan is
checked annually (HMSO, 1995);
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•  In 1997 the new Labour Government, within three
weeks of taking office held a water summit declaring,
amongst other things, that (Environment Agency,
1997):
S water companies will be given mandatory leakage
targets
S water companies will offer a free supply pipe
leakage detection and repair service for their
customers
S water companies must carry out with vigour,
imagination and enthusiasm their water efficiency
duty 
This approach has to some extent been successful.  In the
five years from 1994 to 1998 , the threat of and then the
targets themselves have been largely responsible for a
reduction in leakage from 5,112 cubic meters per day
(m3/day) in 1994/95 to 3,981 m3/day in 1997/98 (Office of
Water Service, 1996/97  - 1997/98).  In addition regulatory
pressure and persuasive and coherent argument has been
helpful in starting to change the culture in water
companies to take water conservation seriously.  However,
the water efficiency plans both in content and action have
been somewhat disappointing.  For most companies the
following represent the sum total of the content: leakage
control, metering, toilet cistern displacement devices and
leaflets.  Noticeably absent in most plans is innovative
thinking; the approach to the plan does not seem to be
“what can we achieve in terms of water saving?”, but
“what is the minimum that we have to do to keep the
regulators off our backs”.  It is the author’s contention that
the regulatory regime, if it wants to encourage cost
effective water conservation and demand management
policies, needs to find a more balanced approach with
respect to carrots and sticks.
Transparency
A by-product of regulation has been transparency.
Considerable amounts of data now enter the public
domain, such as leakage figures, per capita consumption
figures, demand forecasts, numbers of meters installed so
it is possible for anyone to monitor demand trends for any
company.  Most of these data  are published annually in
Ofwat’s Report on Leakage and Water Efficiency based
upon the mandatory July return all companies make to
Ofwat.  Opening up the industry to public scrutiny has
been a very healthy development (Office of Water Service,
1996/97-1997/98).
Competition
Although water supply is a natural monopoly, which in the
absence of true competition requires an economic
regulator, it is likely that there will be increasingly more
opportunities for competition in the future.  The reasoning
is that competition will bring efficiency and as a result
reduce costs for the customer.  At present competition
takes two forms with a third under consideration:
a) Comparative Competition
Ofwat publishes ‘league tables’ of companies based on
particular aspects of performance.  For example,
properties experiencing low pressure, speed of
response to written complaints and leakage levels.
Climbing up the league table is good for the company
image, both as perceived by the City and the customer.
b) Inset Appointments
  For large users (using more than 250 m3/year) it is now
possible for a third party to purchase water supply or
sewerage services from the existing (incumbent) water
company at a discount for onward sale to the
customer.  For the inset appointee and  the customer to
generate profit from this arrangement it is strongly in
their interests to minimise the demand for water and
sewerage.
It would  appear that this represents an opportunity for
water conservation.  However, the threat of such
appointments has resulted in water companies
reducing their tariffs (rates) for their large customers.
Twenty-two of the twenty-seven water companies now
offer declining block tariffs to large users.  Thackray
(Environment Agency, 1999) estimated that the use of
these tariffs could  be leading to  an increase of between
0 and 15 percent in non-household demand.  The
experience from the similarly privatised energy
industry provides a reminder of the dangers of falling
prices due to competition where by 1996, gas use had
increased by 22 percent and electricity by 4 percent
due to falling prices (Warren, 1996).
c) Common Carriage (under consideration)
Already in place in the gas and electricity industries
“common carriage” is the shared use of the existing
pipe network.  This arrangement would give the
customer a choice of supplier, without having to
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physically move to another company’s supply
network.  Those with an available supply of water
would have the opportunity to offer that water to
customers currently served by o ther suppliers.  In 1996
the Department of the Environment issued a
consultation paper and as yet there has been no
movement to translate the principle into practical
proposals (Department of Environment, 1996).  The
threat to water resources is clearly a lowering of the
water price (where that price bears no relationship to
the value of the resource) with a consequent increase
in demand.
Another less noticed effect of the competitive environment
has been the reduced collaboration between water
companies.  Original research is now something ‘to sell’
not ‘to share’ and this has been prevalent in the pilot water
conservation study work that some companies are engaged
in.  As a result the quality and quantity of debate about the
appropriateness of different options is reduced.
SUMM ARY:  PRIV ATISATION - A HELP OR
HINDRANCE IN MANAGING WATER DEMAND?
As a summary of the previous discussion, the table below
expresses the author’s opinion on what has helped and
what has hindered (or is likely to in future) the cause of
water demand management in relation to privatisation of
the water industry in England  and W ales.
It is notable that the list of statements in the ‘Helped’
column does not necessarily require a privatised regime,
but in England and Wales they have been an important
consequence of that regime.
 Helped Hindered
Strong regulatory environment (sticks)
Better accountability of roles between regulated better
division and regulator
Transparency of information
Comparative competition (league tables of leakage
performance, per capita consumption etc.)
Lack of regulatory incentive (carrots)
Short term and narrow financial thinking
Manpower reductions
Public antagonism towards companies
Remoteness from customers, geographically and
politically 
Inset appointments
Common carriage
CONCLUSIONS
The water companies are characterised by short-term
thinking, prefer the large reservoir so lution (with a
guaranteed rate of return) and are disliked by their
customers thus making partnership difficult.  Further
competition will result in a lower price for water ensuring
that payback periods for water conservation measures
lengthen to the extent that they may be shelved.  The
privatisation of former public service  assets into
shareholder ownership has introduced financial
motivation, which does not coincide particularly well with
the wider social and  environmental objectives.
However, there is little doubt that the strong regulatory
environment has stopped, in its tracks, the traditional
‘predict and provide’ approach, and by doing so has
forced demand management onto the agendas of water
companies.  The separation between water service
operations and environmental/economic regulation has
brought considerable clarity to balancing supply and
demand in an environmentally sustainable manner.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that on
balance, privatisation and the accompanying regulatory
framework has not been of overall benefit in attempting to
move England and W ales towards a  more sustainable
water resources policy.
Short Term Remedies
The author concludes that there are three necessary steps
needed to ensure an environmentally sustainable water
resources policy in the short to medium term:
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1. Adjust the economic regulation so that water
companies are allowed to include the cost of water
conservation measures in price limits (if
demonstrably cost effective compared to the
alternatives).  The regulation should also consider
rewarding companies that produce “negalitres” (i.e.
save water).
2. If competition is to proceed along the common
carriage/inset appointment route it is essential that the
full economic cost of water is charged to the
customer (as stated in the draft European Water
Directive).  This means whatever the water company
is able to  reduce,  it’s (financial) price to a surcharge
would have to remain covering the environmental and
social costs related to the abstraction and use of that
water.
3. The water companies need to de-centralise their
operations in an attempt to build local partnerships
with their customers.  By reducing leakage they have,
to some extent, got their own house in order, now
making collaborative water conservation approaches
possible.
A Longer Term Vision
The above suggestions are no more than tinkering with the
existing regime.  A longer term vision would be to have
the public fully embrace the concepts of sustainability,
realising that a better environment and society, can in part,
be attained by their own actions whether this be careful
water use, cycling to work or buying goods with minimal
packaging.  We all need to recognise that a healthy
environment is not the so le responsibility of local and
national government.  A precedent is being set in Phoenix
Arizona where a ‘citizen’ approach focuses on the long
term consequences to the community of water resource
planning, encouraging partnership and shared
responsibility (Babcock and  Ploeser, 1998).   This is being
offered as an alternative to the traditional customer service
model which concentrates on satisfaction of immediate
desires and leaves the future to be planned by the water
provider (as currently operates in England and Wales).
The question is whether a ‘citizen’ approach promoted by
a private  company, motivated by financial profit is within
the realms of possibility.  At this juncture it seems
unlikely.
Hence a longer-term vision would have to include the
water utilities in some form of pub lic ownership (but with
much more dynamism than the pre-1989 water authorities)
which should  bring a  greater degree of accountability. 
The Utilities would then no longer be motivated by
financial profit, but instead have as a mission statement the
need to practice sustainable water  management, providing
the tools and advice for their customers to use water
accordingly.  In many households, the water meters so
badly needed in the short to medium term, would no
longer be required to act as blunt economic instruments,
but as measuring devices to extend the public’s motivation
far beyond saving money to living an environmentally
sustainable lifestyle.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author
and not those of the Environment Agency.
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